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Achieving substantial agricultural trade liberalization has proven elusive in the Doha Round. 
This paper examines policy reforms the United States might adopt to facilitate progress. The 
focus is on whether decoupling can be made more convincing through a long-term buyout that 
would end farm subsidies. Buyouts have not been feasible in the past but recent reforms for 
several specialty crops provide evidence of what might be done and the conditions under which 
it occurs. Although the political-economy conditions may not be conducive to such a buyout yet, 
estimates are provided of the potential cost of a buyout of the main U.S. farm support subsidies 
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Can U.S. Farm Subsidies Be Bought Out?  
 
As the Doha Round of WTO negotiations unfolds, achieving substantial liberalization of 
agricultural trade remains elusive. One reason is that just a few years after the WTO Uruguay 
Round agreements put a set of multilateral trade and subsidy rules in place for agriculture, the 
level of U.S. farm subsidies rose sharply. Simultaneously, some developing countries with 
smaller fiscal resources responded by increasing border protection to shield their domestic 
farmers from declining agricultural prices. Continuation of high subsidies in developed countries 
matched by high tariffs in developing countries remains a possible result of domestic and WTO 
policy decisions. A more desirable outcome would be the globally efficient and welfare-
enhancing solution of low subsidies and low protection.  
 
In this paper I explore a policy option that the United States might use to reduce the long-run 
cost of subsidies and facilitate the liberalization of agricultural trade, while providing substantial 
transition support to farmers. The focus is on whether reforms to decouple farm support 
programs, which are supposed to reduce their production- and trade-distorting effects, can be 
made more convincing through a buyout that would end farm subsidies. Buyouts have not been 
feasible in the past but recent reforms for several specialty crops provide evidence of what might 
be done. Estimates are provided of the potential cost of a buyout of the main U.S. farm support 
subsidies of fixed direct and counter-cyclical payments. A buyout of this type should be on the 
agenda in discussions of the next farm bill. 
 
Reforms of Agricultural Policies 
 
The “Cash Out” Shift Away from Market Interventions 
 
There has been substantial reform of farm policies within the developed countries since the 
1930s New Deal price supports and supply control measures were introduced in the United 
States or the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was later inaugurated to provide a unified price 
support regime in Europe. Orden, Paarlberg and Roe (1999) call the U.S. farm policy reforms 
that have proven feasible over the past half century largely a “cash out” in which direct payments 
to farmers from taxpayers have replaced the support programs that earlier propped up 
commodity market prices. The price support programs required various interventions in markets 
to be operational, including tariff or quota protection, government stock accumulations, domestic 
supply controls, and/or use of export subsidies. As the cash out reforms have proceeded, the New 
Deal programs remained in effect only for a group of specialty crops, particularly peanuts, 
tobacco and sugar.  
 
The cash out reform of U.S. farm policy began in the 1960s. It took a substantial step forward in 
the 1985 farm bill, which lowered minimum price support guarantees (loan rates) while 
providing cash (“deficiency”) payments for a large portion (fixed yields on 85 percent of “base” 
acreage) of the output of supported crops whenever market prices fell below legislated “target 
price” levels. Eligibility for the cash payments required production of specific crops. To control 
fiscal costs a voluntary Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was initiated and annual land 
idling was required. The cashed out U.S. support program with payments on limited output   2
combined with annual land idling authority was exempted from WTO expenditure disciplines 
under the Uruguay Round blue box, while the CRP is a green box policy.  
 
The 1996 U.S. farm bill went further in the cash out direction. Key new reforms were to suspend 
the authority for annual land set-asides and production of specific crops as conditions for 
payment eligibility and to replace the deficiency payments, at a time of high market prices, with 
fixed annual payments based on past production. Even the loan rate minimum producer prices 
were to be guaranteed with payments (“loan deficiency payments”) instead of by government 
stock-holding interventions.
1 Thus, the 1996 policies were more decoupled from production and 
caused less market distortions than previously. The 1996 regime ostensibly paved the way for the 
United States to abandon the blue box in the WTO. But when market prices of farm commodities 
fell after 1996, support to farmers was supplemented with additional payments. Initially these 
“emergency” payments were reported to the WTO as non commodity specific de minimis. The 
2002 farm bill then legislated new counter-cyclical payments tied directly to the levels of market 
prices, but again not to current crop production.
2 With this added support enacted, the United 
States began to argue in the Doha Round for relaxation of the blue box criteria to include the 
counter-cyclical payments instead of seeking its elimination.
3  
 
In the European Union, a similar cash out of price support interventions has occurred, from 
higher initial levels and starting later chronologically than in the United States.
4 Through the 
1980s, intervention prices above world market levels made the EU dependent on direct export 
subsidies. The 1991 McSharry reforms began a cash out, with direct payments offered as 
compensation for lower intervention prices and acreage idling required to limit costs. It was this 
reform, followed by the Agenda 2000 and 2003 CAP reforms, that allowed the EU to sharply 
reduce its use of export subsidies and paved the way for the WTO July 2004 Doha Round 
framework agreement to call for their eliminate by a date certain. The 2003 reforms took the 
decoupling step of introducing whole farm payments for which production of specific crops will 
not be required. Although there are messy implementation rules allowing some support payments 
still tied to production, to an extent the EU with its whole farm payments has moved decoupling 
past the U.S., which retains its price-linked counter-cyclical payments.  
 
Might Farm Program “Buyouts” Facilitate Trade Liberalization 
 
A cash out is a gradual and partial reform process that reduces the market intrusiveness of farm 
programs over the long run by offering their beneficiaries a continuous stream of cash 
compensation payments. The gains for those countries pursuing a cash out are fewer market 
distortions, fewer production restraints, and more competitive export pricing. The extent to 
which cash out measures have decoupled farm support from production decisions and trade 
                                                 
1 The idea of making loan deficiency payments to provide producer price guarantees while allowing market prices to 
fall below the loan rates was first introduced on a limited basis in 1985. 
2 Farmers were also allowed to update their base of eligible output and direct payments were extended to oilseeds. 
Westcott, Young and Price provide a summary of the provisions of the 2002 farm bill. Orden (2003) provides a 
political-economy assessment of its enactment.  
3 The change proposed was that payments otherwise eligible for the blue box be extended from those made “under 
production limiting programs” to also include those that “do not require production.” 
4 Swinbank (2004) provides a concise appraisal of the EU reform process since the late 1980s. 
   3
effects remains under scrutiny.
5 Even when decoupled, a cash out entails an open ended 
commitment to support payments. Thus, cash outs have drawbacks. Dirty decoupling under a 
cash out and the ongoing character of the subsidization remain obstacles to trade liberalization. 
 
Alternatives to the cash out approach for ending intrusive farm program interventions, or even 
for ending a cash out itself, can be distinguished based on the speed of reform implementation 
and whether or not compensation is provided to beneficiaries of the programs (see Figure 1). A 
buyout is a quick termination of support entitlements, made politically palatable through 
significant but temporary compensation up front, in the form of a large cash windfall. A squeeze 
out is an incremental reduction in the market intrusiveness and generosity of farm programs, 
managed slowly enough to avoid triggering a defensive backlash from lobby groups representing 
subsidy-dependent farmers, yet significant enough over time to reduce distortions and costs, and 
to inspire voluntary non-participation by market-oriented commercial farmers. A cutout is a 
quick termination of all program support entitlements without compensation. None of these 
alternatives to a slow compensated cash out has proven feasible on a large scale in the United 
States or Europe. But could a buyout bring an end to domestic farm support programs in 
developed countries, thus reducing the long-run cost of farm programs and advancing the 
prospects for a liberalized agricultural trade regime, while providing transition support to 
farmers? 
 
Figure 1. Alternative Reform Strategies 
Speed of Implementation   
Compensation  Slow Fast 
    Yes Cash  out  Buyout 
    No Squeeze  out  Cutout 
Source: Orden, Paarlberg and Roe (1999). 
 
 
Recent Buyouts: Peanuts and Tobacco  
 
A number of recent policy reforms around the world have provided buyouts. In the United 
States, contrasting recent policy outcomes among the historically similar peanut, tobacco and 
sugar support programs provide some evidence about the conditions conducive to a buyout and 
its consequences. Very briefly, the 2002 restructuring of the peanut program included a buyout 
of production quota rights together with new direct and counter-cyclical payments. The 2004 
tobacco buyout ended quotas and eliminated the loan rate program without implementing new 
                                                 
5 For example, one exception to the decoupling of payments in the 1996 and 2002 farm bills is that production of 
fruits and vegetables is restricted on program base acreage. In a WTO challenge to the U.S. cotton program by 
Brazil, the dispute settlement Appellate Body concluded that restricting production of fruits and vegetables (an 
alternative crop for cotton acreage in California in particular) is inconsistent with the WTO green box criteria.   4




One lesson from the two recent reforms is that narrowly defined benefits, specifically production 
quotas, may be easier to buy out than broader support policies. Binding quota rights were bought 
out both for peanuts and tobacco, whereas sugar marketing allotments that are only intermittently 
binding have not been bought out.  
 
The onset of reform aligns closely with shrinkage of the benefits obtained by participants in the 
old program. The pressure from reduced quotas and revenue was most severe for tobacco and the 
tobacco buyout most complete. Unique dimensions with respect to tobacco also explain the more 
complete buyout of tobacco support compared to peanuts. Domestic tobacco producers had been 
less successful than peanuts or sugar producers in securing restrictions on imports to protect their 
quota rents. The substantial health-cost-related transfers financed by manufacturers, importers 
and consumers in the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement are also unique to the tobacco industry. 
This set the precedent for financing the tobacco buyout with specific assessments instead of 
general tax revenue. Had this precedent not existed, the higher cost of the tobacco buyout ($9.6 
billion) compared to peanuts (about $4 billion over 10 years including ongoing payments) might 
have blocked its enactment. The health issues associated with tobacco consumption also 
contributed to the outcome of full elimination of the support programs for producers. In contrast, 
peanut producers were able to align ongoing support with the cash payment programs for other 
crops.  
  
Consumers have influenced whether buyouts have occurred to the extent that their demand 
behavior contributes to declining benefits under the quota program. But the political condition 
necessary for a buyout appears to be the emergence of substantial support for a reform among 
producers. Emergence of such opinion is obviously related to the shrinkage of benefits. 
Producers excluded from having quotas also tend to favor reform. This is especially evident in 
the case of producers of what were “additional” peanuts, who gained in 2002 by becoming 
eligible for a stronger support program. The opinion among producers in favor of reform does 
not have to be unanimous. In both the peanut and tobacco cases, minorities of producers in high-
cost production regions opposed elimination of the location-specific quotas.  
 
It is also the case that while a buyout may be conducive to liberalization of trade policy, the 
peanut and tobacco buyouts benefited domestic not foreign producers. The United States was 
already a net peanut exporter of additionals—imports were artificially drawn in primarily 
because of the high domestic price under the quota program. In the case of tobacco, total U.S. 
output is likely to rise with the buyout, displacing imports. 
 
In terms of compensation, the buyout payments have been quite lucrative in the recent reforms, 
even given the circumstances of declining benefits to quota owners that have provided the reform 
triggers. The quota buyout payments for peanuts and the quota and total (quota owner and 
                                                 
6 For discussion of the recent policy reforms see, for example, Brown and Thurman; Brown and Snell; Dohlman, 
Hoffman, Young and McBride; Orden and Diaz-Bonilla; Snell;Tiller, Snell and Brown; and Womack (2003, 2004a, 
2004b).    5
operator) buyout payments for flue-cured and burley tobacco are compared to a seven-year 
average (1995-2001) of pre-buyout poundage quota rental rates in Table 1.  
 
For peanuts the lump-sum payment of $0.55/pound made available in the 2002 farm bill is 
equivalent to an infinite stream of payments of $0.026/pound at a 5 percent discount rate. This is 
about 70 percent of the average of past quota rental rates. Alternatively, the quota buyout 
payment is equivalent to the average of annual past rental payments, discounted at 5 percent, 
made for a period of 24 years. The buyout payments exceed this potential future payment stream 
to the extent that domestic peanut prices might have fallen had the earlier program continued. 
Likewise, the buyout payments exceed this future rental revenue stream under the old program if 
the quantity eligible for sale in the domestic market would have continued to decline under its 
continuation.  
 
  Table 1. Value of the Peanut and Tobacco Buyouts (per pound of quota) 
 Peanuts  Flue-cured  Burley 
7-Year Simple Average 
Quota Rent (1995-2001) 
$0.037 $0.471 $0.411 
    
    $7.00 Tobacco Buyout 
    
Quota Buyout Present Value  $0.550  $5.675  $5.675 
Equivalent Infinite Annuity  $0.026  $0.270  $0.270 
Years for Average Rent  24  16  21 
    
    $10.00 Tobacco Buyout 
    
Quota Buyout Present Value  --  $8.108  $8.108 
Equivalent Infinite Annuity  --  $0.386  $0.386 
Years for Average Rent  --  34  56 
Source: Womach, Jasper, “Comparing Quota Buyout Payments for Peanuts and Tobacco,” 
Congressional  Research Service Report RS 1642, October 2003, and author’s calculations. 
Present values, infinite annuities and years for average rent are based on a 5 percent discount rate. 
 
For tobacco, the ten-year stream of annual buyout payments is first discounted back at a 5 
percent rate to an equivalent initial lump sum. This reduces the payment from the nominal $7.00 
to $5.68, as shown in Table 1. The lump sum payment is equivalent to an infinite stream of 
payments of $0.27, about 57 percent of the average of past quota rentals for flue-cured tobacco 
and about 66 percent for burley tobacco. The lump sum payment is more than double the private 
market prices that had prevailed for sales of quota rights before the reform.
7 It is equivalent to 
discounted average rental payments for 16 and 21 years for flue-cured and burley tobacco, 
respectively. Including the $3 payments to growers (also discounted to an up-front lump sum), 
raises the equivalent number of years of past rentals covered (to 34 and 56 years for flue-cured 
                                                 
7 Alston and Sumner (2004) conclude that agricultural quota-right purchase prices are usually heavily discounted.   6
and burley, respectively). Again, the buyout is more lucrative for producers to the extent that 
tobacco prices or quota allocations were likely to have continued to fall under continuation of the 
old program. 
 
The Debate over Larger Buyouts  
 
As the cash out of farm support policies for most crops has occurred, buyouts have on occasion 
been proposed, either as a means to facilitate adjustment out of agriculture or as compensation 
for elimination of a support program. These buyouts have not been adopted because the main 
thrust of farm support programs has been to dampen pressure for adjustment not to facilitate it or 
speed it up.
8 The time has largely passed when farm poverty or large migrations out of 
agriculture provided a rationale for adjustment-dampening policies, and their effectiveness can 
be questioned. Yet the argument that farm policy should facilitate adjustment out of the sector is 
still not widely held. Nor has reform gone so far as to eliminate the main support programs and 
offer buyout compensation. 
 
Bond Schemes in the EU 
 
A “bond scheme” for transforming EU CAP policies was introduced by Tangermann in 1991 
(Swinbank and Tranter, 2004; Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2004). The initial bond proposal was 
made before the EU adopted the 1992 McSharry reforms. As characterized recently by Swinbank 
and Tangermann (2004), the proposal incorporates six steps: 
 
1.  Decouple crop payments from current land use 
2.  Extend this principle to livestock 
3.  Decouple payments from land and attach the entitlements to individuals 
4.  Limit the duration of payments to, say, ten or twenty years, and (possibly) make 
payments degressive over time  
5.  Definitively fix the future level of payments, and 
6.  Transform payment entitlements into bonds. 
 
Swinbank and Tangermann recognize that the EU cash out reforms by 2003 largely accomplish 
their steps 1 and 2. Steps 3-6, they argue, would add two advantages. First, these steps would  
allow land prices to fall to facilitate structural adjustments in production. Second, they would 




The Tangermann bond scheme was an innovative proposal when it was first presented. Whether 
the bond scheme proposal would be a buyout or a delayed cutout depends on the level of 
associated payments. Swinbank and Tangermann center their discussion on payments starting at 
the level of the existing EU farm programs. They argue this would avoid putting additional 
pressure on the EU budget. But guaranteed payments at existing levels for 10 or even 15 years is 
                                                 
8 Orden, Paarlberg and Roe (1999) and De Gorter and Baffes (2004) review several past buyout proposals.   
9 Swinbank and Tangermann (2004) argue that issuing of tradable bonds to a finite-length stream of fixed payments 
would create a flexible asset for the beneficiaries and “lock-in” the policy reform since payments “could not be 
altered without impacting on the wealth of bondholders who are no longer the original farm recipients” (p. 65).   7
not very lucrative for producers by the standard of the quota buyouts for U.S. peanuts or tobacco. 
Nor are some of the other conditions conducive for a buyout particularly strong for EU farm 
payments in 2004. Their remains ambiguity in the 2003 CAP reforms so the benefits being 
bought out by the bonds are not yet narrowly defined. A sharp diminishing of benefits under the 
existing programs is not evident. There is no groundswell of calls for a buyout from producers 
(although producers are not opposed to the scheme according to survey analysis undertaken by 
bond researchers (Tranter et al. (2004)). For these reasons, the prospects may be low for adoption 
of a bond scheme in the near term. Yet, introduction of such bonds, especially with declining 
annual payments over an agreed implementation period, could provide a convincing domestic 
subsidy counter-part to phasing in substantial tariff reductions through the WTO.       
 
Cost of a Larger Buyout of U.S. Farm Payments  
 
So far there has not been a convincing buyout proposal for the main farm support programs in 
the United States.
10 The fixed payments adopted in the 1996 farm bill provided a windfall to 
farmers in a year of high market prices, but that legislation failed to ensure a buyout in three 
respects: a budget baseline remained in place for future farm program spending, the permanent 
farm program legislation from 1949 and related acts was retained, and the 1996 farm bill took no 
other steps to bind the actions of a future Congress. When farm commodity prices fell, the next 
Congress quickly stepped in with additional payments.  
 
A buyout of the 2002 U.S. farm programs could focus on the fixed direct payments, the counter-
cyclical payments, and/or the loan rate price guarantees. The fixed direct payments are a 
narrowly-defined benefit which increases the feasibility of a buyout. Bringing their eventual 
elimination would ease concerns about continued subsidization but would accomplish the least 
economically or institutionally. This is because either the fixed payments or a buyout 
replacement are relatively decoupled and are largely a WTO green box policy. 
 
A buyout of the counter-cyclical payments would accomplish more, since these payments are a 
particularly contentious form of decoupling likely to have some production stimulating effects. A 
buyout of counter-cyclical payments would let the United States abandon the WTO blue box, 
potentially allowing simplification and improved transparency of the WTO rules for agriculture. 
The value to producers of counter-cyclical payments is not as certain as the fixed payments 
under the 2002 farm bill, but there is an upper bound because the payments are made on fixed 
quantities and at per-unit levels no greater than the difference between the target price and the 
sum of the loan rate and per-unit fixed direct payment rate for each commodity. Farmers who 
succeeded politically in building the counter-cyclical payments into the 2002 farm bill to address 
what they viewed as an inadequate safety net in the 1996 legislation are not clamoring to 
eliminate these new payments. But government fiscal deficits that had eased when the 2002 farm 
bill was enacted have increased again. So farm program spending will be under scrutiny.  
 
Table 2 provides information on the potential costs of several buyout options. Results are shown 
separately for a buyout (for all commodities aggregated) of the fixed direct payments, the 
maximum possible counter-cyclical payments, and the expected counter-cyclical payments as 
                                                 
10 Blandford and Boisvert (2004) make a recent call for a buyout of land asset values to facilitate an end to existing 
U.S. farm support program, which they characterize as still being to “think the unthinkable.”   8
evaluated by USDA. Under the 2002 farm bill, for example, fixed direct payments over six 
consecutive years (crop years 2002-2007) have an average annual value of $5.292 billion and a 
discounted present value (at a 5 percent discount rate) of $28.198 billion (row 1).  
 
Buyout payments shown in Table 2 are assumed to be made in equal nominal installments over 
10 years, as in the tobacco case. The buyout costs shown in row 2 are those required to 
compensate for annual payments made for 25 years at the average level of the 2002 farm bill—
this is roughly consistent with the buyout compensation provided for peanuts and tobacco. The 
nominal values of annual payments for which these costs are equivalent as an infinite annuity are 
shown in row 3. 
 
Table 2. Possible Buyouts of the Main U.S. 2002 Farm Bill Support Payments 
Counter-cyclical Payments  Fixed Direct 
Payments 





2002 Farm Bill 
Payments (crop years 
2002-2007) 
5.292 (average) 
28.198 (lump sum) 
7.302 (average) 
38.787 (lump sum) 
3.505 (average) 
18.303 (lump sum) 
Buyout Payments 
Over 10 Years 
Equivalent to Annual 
Payments at 2002 
Farm Bill Level for 25 
Years 
9.659 (annual) 
78.311 (lump sum) 
13.328 (annual) 
108.065 (lump sum) 
6.398 (annual) 
51.870 (lump sum) 
Infinite Annuity 








Note: Fixed direct payments and projected counter-cyclical payments are based on the president’s 2006 
budget. Estimate of maximum counter-cyclical payments is from calculations provided by ERS/USDA. 
Buyout payments are assumed to be made in equal installments over 10 years. Present values and infinite 
annuities are based on a 5 percent discount rate. 
 
A buyout of the fixed direct payments along the lines shown nearly doubles the annual 
expenditure (from $5.292 billion to $9.659 billion) that would have to be made for ten years 
compared to expenditures each year under the 2002 farm bill. It almost triples the present value 
of the payments under the 2002 bill (from $28.198 billion to $78.311 billion). This buyout raises 
short-term costs, but the annual value of equivalent payments in perpetuity ($3.729 billion) is 
less than the average annual payment the 2002 farm bill will deliver during 2002-2007. A buyout 
of the maximum possible counter-cyclical payments is more costly, while a buyout of their 
projected value has a lower cost than for the fixed direct payments.  
   9
Overall, buying out farm support payments raises short-term budget costs but reduces 
expenditures in the long run. Drawing on the recent buyouts for peanut and tobacco quotas, the 
buyout illustrated in Table 2 provides a long transition period and relatively high level of 
compensation. Shorter, sharper buyouts could be undertaken. In either case, short-term costs 
must rise in order for a buyout to provide compensation for the loss of payments further in the 
future. This can still be considered a good deal by taxpayers (who gain in the long run) and 
farmers (who receive a short-term boost). 
 
If farm subsidy payments were to be bought out, there is also an issue of whether any buyout 
could be enforced. The record from the post-1996 increase in support shows new expenditures 
can arise. But several steps can be envisioned that would improve the prospects for adherence to 
a buyout. The first would be to eliminate the permanent legislation for farm support programs. A 
WTO agreement built around a buyout of U.S. counter-cyclical payments might also provide an 
enforcement mechanism.   
 
Stronger steps could also be taken. Contracts for buyout payments could require that the acreage 
for which the payments were bought out (and the output from that acreage) be ineligible for 
future support legislated by Congress. To ensure compliance, such contracts might be structured 
similarly to those by which some farmers sell their “development rights” to state and local 
governments for the different purpose of their land remaining in rural condition or agricultural 
use. The state governments have devised binding legal criteria to ensure compliance from the 
contract beneficiaries who have sold their development rights.  
 
Can There Be a Buyout in the Next Farm Bill?  
 
Achieving beneficial multilateral liberalization of agricultural trade has remained elusive. This 
paper has explored a long-term buyout that would end farm subsidies as a policy option the 
United States might use to facilitate progress while providing substantial transition support to 
farmers.  
 
The differing recent policy outcomes among the historically similar peanut, tobacco and sugar 
support programs provide some evidence about the conditions conducive to a buyout and its 
consequences. Narrowly defined benefits, specifically quota rights, may be easier to buy out than 
broader support policies. The onset of reform aligns closely with a sharp shrinkage of the 
benefits obtained by participants in the old program. The political condition necessary for a 
buyout appears to be the emergence of substantial support for reform among producers, which is 
related to the shrinkage of benefits. While a buyout may be conducive to liberalization of trade 
policy, the peanuts and tobacco buyouts have benefited domestic not foreign producers.  
 
In terms of compensation, the payments have been quite lucrative for the buyout reforms that 
have occurred, especially given the circumstances of declining benefits to quota owners that have 
provided the reform triggers. For peanuts the lump-sum payment of $0.55/pound is equivalent (at 
a 5 percent discount rate) to previous average quota rental payments for a period of 24 years. For 
tobacco, the ten-year stream of owner buyout payments is more than double the private market 
prices that had prevailed for sales of quota rights before the reform. It is equivalent to discounted 
average rental payments for 16 and 21 years for flue-cured and burley tobacco, respectively.    10
There has not yet been a convincing buyout proposal for the main supported farm commodities 
and the political environment may still be far from prompting such a reform. Yet such a reform 
should be on the agenda in discussions of the next farm bill. Buyouts of the fixed direct and 
counter-cyclical payments along lines similar to the peanut or tobacco quota buyouts would 
nearly double the annual expenditures that would have to be made for ten years compared to 
expenditures each year under the 2002 farm bill, and almost triple the present value of those 
payments. Thus, a buyout will raise short-term costs, but the equivalent annual payments in 
perpetuity will be less than the 2002 farm bill has delivered in recent years. Such a buyout is an 
investment in the future. It provides long-term savings for taxpayers, enhanced transition support 
to farmers, and a basis on which to pursue more open global agricultural markets.   11
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